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Chapter 13
FINDING A PLACE FOR WORLD WAR I 
IN AMERICAN HISTORY
1914–2018
Jennifer D. Keene
Y•Z
World War I has occupied an uneasy place in the American public and 
political consciousness.1 In the 1920s and 1930s, controversies over the 
war permeated the nation’s cultural and political life, infl uencing memo-
rial culture and governmental policy. Intere st in the war, however, waned 
considerably after World War II, a much larger and longer war for the 
United States. Despite a plethora of scholarly works examining nearly ev-
ery aspect of the war, interest in the war remains limited even among ac-
ademic historians. In many respects, World War I became the “forgotten 
war” because Americans never developed a unifying collective memory 
about its meaning or the political lessons it offered. Americans remem-
bered the Civil War as the war that ended slavery and saved the union, 
World War II as “the good war” that eliminated fascist threats in Europe 
and the Pacifi c, the Cold War as a struggle for survival against a commu-
nist foe, and Vietnam as an unpopular war. By comparison, World War I 
failed to fi nd a stable place in the national narrative.
The 2014–18 global centennial commemoration created a cultural mo-
ment when it became almost mandatory for Americans to acknowledge 
the war. These remembrances occurred during an uneasy time in post-9/11 
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American society. The fl awed military interventions in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, instability in the Middle East, worries that the “American Century” 
had ended, and concerns about maintaining civil liberties during an end-
less domestic “war on terror” prompted a myriad of articles and refl ections 
in the popular press that drew parallels between the present and 1914–18. 
Public intellectuals used the exercise of centennial commemoration to 
interrogate the dilemmas plaguing the United States in the twenty-fi rst 
century.2 In contrast, the overtly nationalistic tone injected into the po-
litical arena during and after the 2016 presidential election reinforced the 
tendency in offi cial commemorative events to emphasize American tri-
umphalism. The American military victory was generally presented as the 
launching pad for the nation’s rise to superpower status, complimenting 
(perhaps unintentionally) the new Republican administration’s desire to 
resurrect pride in America’s past accomplishments and singular greatness.
At the same time, however, the centennial moment laid the founda-
tion for a scholarly renaissance in World War I studies. The lectures, ex-
hibits, and conferences organized by libraries, museums, and universities 
throughout the United States left a lingering footprint. Many archives 
took advantage of the sudden availability of funds to fully inventory, and 
sometimes even digitize, their World War I holdings. The Library of Con-
gress, for instance, crafted a major exhibit, “Echoes of the Great War: The 
American Experiences of World War I,” accompanied by detailed sum-
maries of World War I–related holdings and new online resources that 
included sheet music, photographs, maps, and manuscripts. Similarly, the 
Pennsylvania Academy of Fine Arts mounted a comprehensive art ex-
hibit, “World War I and American Art,” that offered a major reinterpre-
tation by challenging the traditional assumption that American artists 
barely noticed the confl ict.3
Equally important, every public event prompted yet another American 
to delve into personal family history, and the material uncovered often 
found its way into the public domain through privately produced letter 
collections or as donations to local libraries and archives.4 Andrew J. 
Huebner’s Love and Death in the Great War represented a scholarly take on 
this popular desire to evaluate the war’s impact on families.5 The sudden 
sense that participation in the war was an important historical experience 
worthy of remembrance imbued letters and artifacts with new value to 
both families and professional archivists. Indeed, Huebner’s own family 
fi gures prominently in Love and Death.
The emphasis on local commemoration also received a boost when the 
National Endowment for the Humanities funded World War I lectures 
and exhibits in local public libraries across all fi fty states.6 Many towns 
“re-discovered” how World War I infused their own cultural landscape. 
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Art historian Mark Levitch initiated the World War I Memorial Inven-
tory Project7 and successfully relied on crowdsourcing to create a data-
base of local monuments and memorials. Subsequently, the 100 Cities/
100 Memorials project offered funds to restore these long-forgotten testi-
monies to American participation in the war. Interest in the local expe-
rience of war was mirrored in scholarly works that focused on particular 
cities or regions, such as Ross J. Wilson’s New York and the First World 
War: Shaping an American City.8
The fl ip side of interest in the local were efforts to incorporate the 
American experience into the new scholarly turn toward examining the 
war as a global confl ict. The 2014 three-volume anthology edited by 
Jay Winter, The Cambridge History of the First World War, fully incorpo-
rated the United States into the global history of the war.9 The National 
World War I Museum in Kansas City, Missouri, also preferred events that 
helped educate the public about the entire war rather than just the U.S. 
experience.
The United States got a late start organizing for the centennial. Cre-
ated in 2013, the twelve-member U.S. World War I Centennial Commis-
sion received minimal public funding (as opposed to the United Kingdom, 
which pledged £50 million to mark the occasion). A comprehensive web-
site and podcast series publicized centennial-related news, but remem-
brance activities relied primarily on the ad hoc efforts of local museums, 
universities, state commissions, and dedicated individuals. The commis-
sion devoted considerable time trying to drum up support for the erection 
of a national World War I memorial in Washington, DC. To that end, the 
commission secured needed governmental approvals, held a competition 
to select a design, and even held a ground-breaking ceremony in Pershing 
Park—the site selected for the proposed monument. Nonetheless, as the 
centennial drew to a close, the monument remained unbuilt and under-
funded. Frank Buckles, the last surviving American World War I veteran, 
had died in 2011.10 Without any living veterans to honor, the commission 
lacked a compelling argument for creating the memorial beyond pointing 
out that World War I had been forgotten in the late twentieth-century 
monument-building frenzy that resulted in memorials to World War II, 
Korea, and Vietnam on the National Mall.
A hundred years earlier, the political imperative had been completely 
different. Initially, fi rsthand memories of the confl ict dominated both fi c-
tional and historical interpretations of the American war effort as par-
ticipants struggled to come to terms with the war. Scholars have been 
animated by a similar collective desire to recapture what the war meant 
to those who lived through it and its lasting legacy on the United States. 
Delving deeper into how cultural, diplomatic, military, political, and social 
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historians have examined the war reveals ongoing debates rather than fi rm 
answers to these two essential questions.
World War I in American Popular Culture
Throughout the twentieth century, Americans’ most sustained encounter 
with the war came through literature. Veteran novelists, including Er-
nest Hemingway, John Dos Passos, and F. Scott Fitzgerald, wrote enduring 
classics that embraced themes of disillusionment, cynicism, absurdity, and 
sexual dysfunction.11 These novels portrayed the war as a rite of passage 
for young men and women who lost their adolescent naiveté within the 
crucible of war. Classic American fi lms also reinforced the prevailing por-
trait of senseless slaughter along the Western Front. All Quiet on the West-
ern Front and Paths of Glory condensed the war into the horror of trench 
warfare, corrupt offi cers, and disillusioned youth.12 This emphasis on hu-
man carnage permeated the larger culture, setting a paradigm for under-
standing the war even among those who never actually read these books 
or watched these fi lms. Novels and fi lms that valorized the war’s idealism 
and sacrifi ce, such as Willa Cather’s One of Ours, Edith Wharton’s A Son 
at the Front, and the Howard Hawks–directed Sergeant York had no lasting 
impact on popular memory.13
Over time, Lost Generation novels and fi lms served less as indict-
ments of World War I and more as universal statements on the shock 
of confronting the reality of war. The themes of disillusionment high-
lighted in these artistic works struck a nerve during the Vietnam War 
era when Americans began once again to question the effi cacy of using 
war to spread democratic values. Stanley Cooperman’s World War I and 
the American Novel drew parallels between the sentiments expressed in 
antiwar fi ction of the 1920s and street protests against the Vietnam War. 
In The Gun and the Pen: Hemingway, Fitzgerald, Faulkner, and the Fiction 
of Mobilization, Keith Gandal rejects the antiwar label attached to Lost 
Generation fi ction.14 Gandal instead argues that the root of postwar dis-
illusionment came not from having experienced fi ghting fi rsthand but 
rather from Hemingway and Fitzgerald having failed to reach the West-
ern Front as offi cers. In a subsequent book, War Isn’t the Only Hell: A 
New Reading of World War I American Literature, Gandal reinterprets a 
broader range of veteran-authored fi ction, viewing these works as uneasy 
mediations on how military mobilization challenged existing hierarchies 
of class, ethnicity, and gender.15
In the immediate aftermath of the war, offi cial committees mobilized 
to commemorate a war that they believed Americans would long regard 
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as a seminal event in the nation’s history. Veterans’ organizations and 
local communities mobilized to erect monuments throughout the nation. 
The American Battle Monuments Commission undertook the massive 
task of compiling a comprehensive battlefi eld guidebook. The commis-
sion expected tourists and pilgrims to retrace the steps of American sol-
diers as they paid their respects to the dead. Originally published in 1938, 
the guide instead became obsolete almost immediately, collecting dust on 
library shelves. Similarly, by the time the fundraising and construction 
of monuments had concluded in the late 1920s and early 1930s, public 
interest in the war had waned.16 More recently, the World War I Cen-
tennial Commission and American Battlefi eld Monuments Commission 
tried to renew interest in the war by opening visitor centers and orga-
nizing offi cial commemorative events to mark key battles, including si-
multaneous ceremonies at all offi cial World War I overseas cemeteries on 
11 November 2018.
Few Americans bought or read the slew of participant memoirs that 
appeared in the interwar period. Some were poorly written, while others 
appeared after the reading public had tired of rehashing the war. Many 
memoir writers also found that their accounts differed too dramatically 
with the now-accepted paradigm established by the Lost Generation nov-
elists. Steven Trout notes, for instance, that the combat memoir of John 
Lewis Barkley, a highly decorated U.S. soldier, “did not line up with ac-
cepted wisdom (at least among artists and intellectuals) about how soldiers 
of the Great War were supposed to remember their experiences.”17 Barkley 
championed camaraderie and individual resilience. Something of a “war 
lover,” he relished the excitement of battle and killing enemy soldiers. Out 
of step with the times, Barkley’s memoir failed to fi nd an audience.
Unlike the Somme for the British or Verdun for the French, the 1918 
Meuse-Argonne campaign (the culminating U.S. battle in World War I) 
found no lasting place in American memory. The high death toll did not 
result in an indictment of American military leadership (as it did in Viet-
nam), nor did the victory cause subsequent generations of Americans to 
relish their role in defeating Germany (as in World War II). Other wars, 
historian Edward Lengel contends, simply offer Americans better sto-
ries—ones with a clear beginning and end, with easily identifi able heroes 
and villains who serve as mirrors that allow Americans to see their val-
ues, their strengths, and their fl aws more clearly.18 The memory of World 
War I, by contrast, focuses nearly exclusively on the universal horrors 
of war, and therefore offers no such prism for championing American 
exceptionalism.
Steven Trout offers a different argument for the indifference and igno-
rance that pervades American society about World War I.19 Rather than 
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willfully purging the war from the national consciousness, Trout believes 
that Americans remembered the war in too many diverse ways. What 
exactly should the nation recall about the war? The failure of neutrality? 
The bravery of the combat soldier? The futility of trench warfare? The 
racial discrimination that permeated the ranks? The domestic attacks 
on German Americans? The botched peace processes? These competing 
memories refl ected existing political and social divisions within Ameri-
can society during the twenties and thirties, preventing Americans from 
forming a sustainable, collective memory about the war.
Nonetheless, from 1918 through 1945, the war was anything but for-
gotten, suggesting that “forgetting” is a more recent phenomenon. Amer-
ica grappled with the loss of 120,000 soldiers (half of these in combat, the 
rest mostly as a result of the infl uenza epidemic), and the reintegration of 
nearly 200,000 wounded men. Historian G. Kurt Piehler has traced the 
physical presence of World War I in towns and cities where Americans 
drove their cars on Pershing Drives, attended meetings in Memorial Halls, 
and watched football games on Soldiers’ Fields.20 Critical of the plethora 
of mass-produced statues erected after the Civil War that lionized leaders 
and foot soldiers, memorialization in the 1920s took a utilitarian turn, 
honoring servicemen through the creation of community structures that 
improved civic life. In 1921, the remains of an unidentifi ed soldier were 
buried in the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Arlington Cemetery, a 
noteworthy alteration of the nation’s commemorative landscape. At 
a time when no wars had national monuments (the present structures 
dedicated to World War II, the Korean War, and Vietnam War appeared 
toward the end of the twentieth century), the creation of a national site 
of mourning and remembrance explicitly for World War I represented a 
unique commemorative practice.
Almost immediately, however, Americans splintered in the meaning 
they attached to the Unknown Soldier. Americans debated whether the 
tomb represented victory, peace, or valor (the sarcophagus erected in 
1932 over the grave included allegorical fi gures for all three). African 
American civil rights activists adopted the trope of the Unknown Soldier 
to highlight the nation’s refusal to adequately recognize the contributions 
of black soldiers.21 Town monuments also refl ected this ambiguity over 
whether the nation was commemorating victory or mourning loss in the 
statues they erected with plaques listing the community’s war dead.
Over time, townsfolk added the names of fallen soldiers from other 
wars to these plaques, weakening their symbolic link to World War I. 
A similar dilution occurred when the remains of unidentifi ed soldiers 
from World War II, Korea, and Vietnam were buried in the Tomb of the 
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Unknown Soldier.22 The same fate befell the annual Armistice Day com-
memorations that began on 11 November 1919 to remember the fallen 
in World War I. In 1954 Armistice Day became Veterans Day, a holi-
day dedicated to honoring all living and deceased members of the armed 
forces. Such transformations were not unique to American remembrance 
of World War I. The passage of time had weakened ties between the Civil 
War and Decoration Days—originally two separate days when relatives in 
the North and South decorated the graves of fallen soldiers. By the twen-
tieth century, as the divisions between North and South healed, the term 
Memorial Day came into vogue with commemorations now honoring the 
fallen of all wars on the same day in May. Memorial Day became an offi -
cial federal holiday in 1971.
In the interwar period, the government erected eight national overseas 
military cemeteries in France and Belgium, placing the gravesites of in-
dividual soldiers in the shadows of massive memorials recalling the scope 
and complexity of American combat operations.23 Lisa M. Budreau argues 
that the government constructed overseas memorials and cemeteries to 
underscore the emergence of the United States as a major world power 
during the war, but burying fallen American soldiers overseas proved do-
mestically contentious.24 In 1917, Secretary of War Newton Baker had 
promised to return the bodies of war dead to their families for burial in lo-
cal communities. In 1919, however, the government reversed course and 
began pressuring families to keep their loved ones near the fi eld of honor 
where they fell. The specter of thousands of coffi ns arriving home pre-
sented the worrisome prospect that grief might become the predominant 
memory of the war. Equally disturbing, the possibility that bringing home 
all war dead would allow France and Britain to downplay the American 
contribution to the overall victory. In the end, nearly 70 percent of fam-
ilies demanded that the government repatriate the bodies of their loved 
ones. With fewer bodies available to offer visual evidence of America’s 
contribution to the victory, the American Battlefi elds Monument Com-
mission designed the offi cial overseas cemeteries with ample space be-
tween gravestones to camoufl age the fact that so few American soldiers 
were buried in them.
The distinctly American way of mourning privileged some forms of re-
membrance over others. In Of Little Comfort: War Widows, Fallen Soldiers, 
and the Remaking of the Nation after the Great War, Erika Kuhlman argues 
that war widows became public symbols through which American society 
could grieve for the war dead, but only if they exhibited stoic acceptance 
of their loss.25 Nancy K. Bristow, in American Pandemic: The Lost Worlds 
of the 1918 Infl uenza Epidemic, argues that over time stories of loss from 
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infl uenza or combat became private rather than public stories.26 Sustained 
despair and grief were culturally unacceptable within the United States, a 
society that privileged optimism and progress.
World War I in American Political Culture
The war exerted its greatest impact on American domestic political cul-
ture during the 1930s. Two singular events in American history, the Gold 
Star Mother Pilgrimages and 1932 Bonus March by World War I veterans, 
revealed the resonance of the war’s legacy during the Great Depression. 
These two staged events highlighted the emotional and fi nancial cost of 
the war to average citizens, underscoring the government’s responsibility 
to mitigate that suffering.
Between 1930 and 1933, the government funded twenty Gold Star 
Mother voyages for the mothers and widows of fallen soldiers to visit 
overseas gravesites. Gold Star Mothers derived their name from the fl ag 
embossed with a gold star that many families of fallen soldiers hung in 
their windows. The government had encouraged the families of service-
men to display fl ags with a blue star to advertise their support of the war. 
Once soldiers began dying, offi cials urged families to grieve discretely by 
changing the star from blue to gold instead of draping their doors and 
porches in traditional black crepe.
Effective lobbying by the Gold Star Mothers Association portrayed the 
trip as fulfi lling a debt to the women who had fi rst suffered the death of 
their loved ones and then lost a site of mourning once they agreed to let 
the government bury their soldier overseas.27 Much like the impulse to 
create overseas cemeteries, government offi cials expected the Gold Star 
Mother Pilgrimages to advance broader diplomatic goals. The trips oc-
curred in the wake of renewed cultural and diplomatic interactions with 
France including Charles Lindbergh’s historic New York–Paris fl ight and 
the Kellogg-Briand Pact, an international agreement that outlawed wars 
of aggression. The pilgrimages served as visible illustrations of wartime 
sacrifi ce ushering in a peaceful future of international understanding and 
cooperation. The voyages were not without controversy, however. Afri-
can American women traveled separately, received inferior accommoda-
tions, and faced pressure from civil rights organizations to boycott the 
pilgrimages to protest racial discrimination.
During the most severe years of the Great Depression, the nation 
proved willing to expend $5 million to send 6,685 mothers and widows to 
visit graves overseas. The demand by living veterans in the early thirties 
that the government pay them their promised bonus proved much more 
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contentious. Controversy over the soldiers’ bonus extended back to 1920. 
In Doughboys, the Great War, and the Remaking of America I argued that 
conscription created a social compact between the state and conscripted 
soldiers that endured well after they returned home.28 In veterans’ eyes, if 
the state had the power to draft men, it also had the ability and responsibil-
ity to prevent war from fi nancially ruining the lives of those it conscripted.
In 1924, Congress awarded World War I veterans a monetary bonus 
in the form of a bond that matured in 1945. Once the Depression hit, 
however, veterans began agitating for early payment of the bond. This 
grassroots movement culminated in the 1932 Bonus March when thirty 
thousand World War I veterans marched on Washington, DC, and set up 
an encampment that lasted for six weeks until the army violently evicted 
the protesters from the capital. Veterans ultimately received their bonus 
payment in 1936, by which time they had become an infl uential part of 
the left-leaning political coalition pushing President Franklin D. Roos-
evelt (FDR) to embrace liberal social welfare policies aimed at redistrib-
uting wealth more equitably throughout American society.
The climax of World War I veterans’ infl uence over American politics 
came in the fi nal years of World War II, when the American Legion and 
Veterans of Foreign Wars steered the GI Bill of Rights through the leg-
islative process. World War I veterans had created the American Legion 
in 1919 to form a veterans’ organization that all servicemen could join, 
regardless of where they served. In contrast, the Veterans of Foreign Wars 
(established in 1899 after the Spanish American War) only admitted 
those who had served overseas. Recent scholarship reveals how these vet-
erans’ organizations helped erect the modern social-welfare state. The GI 
Bill, for instance, granted returning World War II veterans comprehensive 
benefi ts, including unemployment compensation, college tuition, health-
care, and low-interest housing loans.29 In Beyond the Bonus March and GI 
Bill: How Veteran Politics Shaped the New Deal Era, Stephen Ortiz suggests 
that veterans, as New Deal dissidents, helped convince FDR to champion 
social justice measures such as the creation of the social security system.30 
Jessica Adler’s Burdens of War: Creating the United States Veteran Health 
System examines how World War I veterans’ claim that they had “earned” 
the right to life-long, federally subsidized medical care eventually resulted 
in the creation of a universal healthcare system for only one segment of 
the American population.31 Other scholars, however, put more empha-
sis on the legion’s reactionary rather than progressive impulses, detailing 
their active participation in the First Red Scare and pursuit of restrictive 
immigration laws and isolationist foreign policies.32
As these studies suggest, the political fallout from World War I affected 
more than veterans’ benefi ts. In the 1930s, politicians also drew lessons 
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from the war to shape American foreign policy. The U.S. Senate’s Nye 
Committee investigation accused bankers and arms dealers of working 
behind the scenes to convince President Woodrow Wilson to abandon 
neutrality and declare war. In this formulation, fears that an Allied loss 
would preclude repayment of war loans eventually prompted the United 
States to abandon its long-standing, self-imposed prohibition on overseas 
foreign entanglements. Distrust of fi nancial elites as single-mindedly pur-
suing their own profi ts at the expense of the public good, irresponsibility 
that many Americans felt had caused the Great Depression, accounted 
for the popularity of this view. Economist John Maurice Clark’s The Cost 
of the World War to the American People, published by the Carnegie En-
dowment for International Peace, refl ected this popular concern with the 
ongoing fi nancial burdens of a war estimated to have cost $32 billion.33 
The charge that the fi nancial and business elite had callously sacrifi ced 
American youth to boost their own profi ts gained scholarly credence from 
works such as Helmut C. Engelbrecht and Frank C. Hanighen’s The Mer-
chants of Death: A Study of the International Armament Industry.34 When 
Britain and France defaulted on war loans owed to the U.S. government 
in the 1930s, a consensus developed that the nation had been duped into 
fi ghting and fi nancing a meaningless war that now threatened to bank-
rupt the country. In the end, the Nye Committee only proved that muni-
tions dealers quickly took advantage of the new markets that the outbreak 
of war created. But this conspiracy theory nonetheless proved satisfying 
during a time when many Americans worried about the disproportionate 
infl uence the rich exerted over the national economy.
The merchants-of-death argument resonated powerfully enough to spur 
Congress to adopt a series of neutrality laws from 1935 to 1939 that sought 
to limit American economic ties to belligerent nations as war clouds gath-
ered once again in Europe. These laws restricted arms sales, loans, and 
transport of goods with nations at war, encapsulating the widespread view 
that actions by fi nancial elites had forced the nation to fi ght an unpopular 
war that ultimately harmed the nation. Even after Adolf Hitler began his 
wars of conquest throughout Western Europe, the merchant-of-death ar-
gument held sway and slowed the sending of aid to Great Britain. Before 
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor brought the United States into the 
war in 1941, FDR had to work around the edges of the politically popular 
neutrality laws through programs like lend-lease, which claimed that the 
United States was “lending” rather than “selling” arms to Great Britain.
The last overt infl uence of the war on American political culture came 
when FDR and his advisors tried to “learn lessons” from Wilson’s bungled 
management of the peace process. After World War I, the United States 
rejected the controversial Versailles peace treaty and refused to join the 
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League of Nations. To develop a strong relationship with the Senate (the 
body that ratifi es treaties), Roosevelt chose Missouri senator Harry S. 
Truman as his running mate in 1944 and enlisted early support from 
prominent Republicans for his plans. The popular view that America’s 
interwar isolationism had emboldened imperial militarism worldwide also 
convinced Americans that the United States needed to take a leading 
role in creating and maintaining the United Nations.
Beginning and Ending the War
Political and diplomatic historians have focused on two essential ques-
tions: Why did the United States enter World War I, and why, having 
won the war, did the United States lose the peace? Over the decades, 
historians have disagreed over whether fi nancial ties to the Allies, con-
cerns about German aggression, or a desire to shape the peace ultimately 
prompted President Woodrow Wilson to abandon neutrality for bellig-
erency. Historians have also continually debated how the new vision of 
American world leadership articulated by Wilson through his peace plat-
form shaped the “American Century.”
In assessing the causes of the war, the economic argument dominated 
in the 1920s and 1930s. Leading historians in the 1930s rejected the con-
spiratorial overtones of the merchant-of-death theorists but nonetheless 
linked the decision for war to economics. In their view, Wilson’s desire to 
protect the overall health of the U.S. economy gradually eroded his com-
mitment to neutrality. Certain that economics directly affected political 
decisions, historians Charles Beard, Clinton Grattan, and Charles Tansill 
noted that the entire American economy benefi ted from the increase in 
trade with the Allied nations.35 This economic dependence made it dif-
fi cult, if not impossible, for Wilson to risk a rupture with Britain over its 
blockade policies or accept Germany’s attempt to curtail war-related trade 
with a policy of unrestricted submarine warfare. Rather than blaming 
special interests for pushing the nation into war, this perspective tended 
to sympathize with the diffi cult choices facing Wilson. By 1917, “the al-
ternative policy of strict adherence to its earlier standards of neutrality 
meant economic depression on a national scale,” Paul Birdsall argued.36
In subsequent decades, the economic argument continued to persuade 
some, albeit in more nuanced form. Ross Gregory, in The Origins of Ameri-
can Intervention in the First World War, noted that disproportionate trading 
and lending to the Allies increasingly tied American economic prosperity 
to an Allied victory, while negative publicity surrounding the Lusitania 
sinking and Zimmermann Telegram hardened American views against 
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Germany.37 More recently, Benjamin O. Fordham argued for a reconsid-
eration of economic causes to explain American entry into World War I 
by disaggregating national economic fi gures to reveal the correlation be-
tween regions that benefi ted from the wartime export boom and voting 
patterns by their congressional representatives.38
In the wake of World War II and at the height of the Cold War, the 
idea that the United States went to war primarily to protect its economic 
interests fell out of favor. The muting of class confl ict in the booming 
post–World War II economy and America’s ideological and strategic bat-
tle with the Soviet Union infl uenced the scholarly debate. Throughout 
the rest of the twentieth century historians placed increased emphasis on 
Wilson’s ideological desire to spread democratic values and how German 
aggression threatened national security.
Two infl uential Wilson biographers, John Milton Cooper Jr. and 
Lloyd E. Ambrosius, agreed that Wilson’s desire to spread American-style 
democracy and capitalism was the catalyst that drew the United States 
into war.39 Others like Arthur Link argued that the resumption of aggres-
sive unrestricted submarine warfare gave Wilson no choice but to enter 
the war.40 “The weakness of Link’s argument is that it accepts too easily 
Wilson’s contention that there was no other way to protect American in-
terests than to go to war,” Kendrick Clements countered.41 Clements be-
lieved that Wilson painted himself into a corner by not thinking through 
the potential ramifi cations of taking a hard line with Germany in 1915 
and 1916 concerning unrestricted submarine warfare. He concluded that 
the administration’s inexperience with foreign policy refl ected the na-
tion’s growing pains as it sought to assert itself as a world power, resulting 
in an unnecessary war.
Some national-security-based arguments have focused on the Zimmer-
mann Telegram as the deus ex machina that brought the United States 
into the war.42 Barbara Tuchman and Frederick Katz viewed the telegram 
as the culmination of a long, secretive German campaign to incite a bor-
der war between the United States and Mexico.43 Taking advantage of 
newly released German records, Thomas Boghardt reevaluates the tele-
gram as a spontaneous German decision, unconnected to any coordinated 
strategic plan.44 The German resumption of unrestricted submarine war-
fare, Boghardt concludes, proved more infl uential than the telegram in 
bringing about a U.S. declaration of war.
Ross A. Kennedy emphasizes that as the European war spread through-
out the globe, especially to the high seas, Wilson came to believe that 
the physical barriers of two oceans were no longer enough to protect 
the United States. By the time he asked Congress to declare war, Wil-
son thought that “if Germany won the war, power politics would persist, 
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and America would continue to be ensnared in its destructive dynamics,” 
Kennedy writes.45 In Kennedy’s interpretation, Wilson’s desire to rebuild 
the international political system to safeguard American sovereignty mat-
tered more than spreading democracy or protecting the economy when it 
came to declaring war.
More recently, scholars have turned the spotlight away from Wilson 
to better gauge Americans’ reactions to the European war. John Branden 
Little chides historians for overlooking the massive American humani-
tarian relief effort, totaling more than $6 billion ($120 billion in 2009 
dollars), undertaken to alleviate civilian suffering in Europe, the Soviet 
Union, and the Near East between 1914 and 1924.46 According to Little, 
through their donations of money, goods, and time, Americans devel-
oped faith that they could positively impact the direction of world affairs 
and therefore had their own reasons for embracing Wilson’s broader war 
goals. Julia F. Irwin’s Making the World Safe: The American Red Cross and a 
Nation’s Humanitarian Awakening further underscores how voluntary hu-
manitarian work during World War I created the twentieth-century belief 
that foreign aid benefi ted both the world and the United States.47 By con-
trast, Michael S. Neiberg believes that most Americans shared Wilson’s 
concerns about the nation’s growing vulnerability to German expansion-
ism by April 1917, and therefore fought primarily to protect America’s 
borders rather than to advance Wilson’s broader peace scheme. Neiberg 
sees a consensus for war taking shape. Michael Kazin, however, believes 
that Wilson’s hesitancy refl ected the strength of the peace movement, 
whose members continued to doubt the wisdom of war even after the 
United States entered the confl ict.48
The nature of Wilson’s peace platform, especially its long-term infl u-
ence, has generated scholarly debate as well. “Wilsonianism should be 
seen not as a transient phenomenon, a refl ection of some abstract idealism, 
but a potent defi ner of contemporary history” because it established the 
ideological framework motivating the United States to become a global 
power, Akira Iriye wrote in 1993.49 Cooper Jr. saw Wilson establishing a 
framework of fundamentally sound democratic values (self-determination, 
open trade, and collective security) that guided future foreign policy. 
Ambrosius, among others, lamented the birth of a destructive messianic 
impulse that would justify countless, and often unnecessary, American 
interventions throughout the world in the twentieth century.50
Scholars have also differed over whether the president was idealistic or 
pragmatic in pursuing his peace proposals. In Woodrow Wilson and World 
Settlement, Wilson’s press secretary Ray Stannard Baker presented Wilson 
as an idealist whose Progressive reformer background and Christian faith 
encouraged him to foster a new international role for the United States, 
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helping peoples elsewhere obtain the right to self-government.51 This ide-
alistic interpretation of Wilson’s principles and motivations held sway, 
even among the “realist” school of thought that criticized the president as 
too inexperienced to enact this vision.
“Realist” studies written in the shadow of World War II by Walter 
Lipp mann (U.S. War Aims, 1944) and George F. Kennan censored Wil-
son for failing to understand the mechanics of international politics and 
the value of balance of power alliances to stop aggressive dictators.52 Ar-
thur Link challenged this depiction of Wilson as an unrealistic idealist 
animated by his Christian faith and scholarly study of American govern-
ment. Wilson’s notion “that an enduring peace could come only through 
a ‘peace without victory,’ a ‘peace between equals,’” was more realistic 
than “the European leaders who thought that they could win decisive vic-
tories on the battlefi elds and on or under the seas, and who thought that 
they could impose their nations’ wills upon other great peoples,” Link 
argued.53 At the height of the Cold War, Arno J. Mayer added a new 
dimension to the idealist/realist debate by highlighting Wilson’s faith in 
capitalism.54 Mayer argued that Wilson’s Fourteen Points had a pragmatic 
purpose: to stop the momentum gathering in favor of communism as the 
political system of the future. Mayer, and other revisionist accounts in the 
1960s, portrayed Wilson as successfully positioning the United States to 
emerge as a global economic hegemon in the twentieth century.55
Other historians took on the realists’ characterization of Wilson as 
an inept diplomat. David F. Trask concluded that Wilson appropriately 
focused diplomatic discussions in 1917 on coordinating the Allied war 
effort rather than insisting on Allied support for his peace proposals as a 
condition for U.S. aid.56 Maintaining American independence of action 
by fi ghting as an Associate Power, sending a large army overseas, and re-
sisting pressures to amalgamate American armed forces into the British 
and French armies were all decisions that Wilson made with an eye on 
maximizing his infl uence over the eventual peace conference, according 
to David M. Esposito.57 John Thompson noted that Wilson was savvy 
enough to prepare for the anticipated diplomatic showdown with the 
Allies at the peace conference by creating The Inquiry, whose multiple 
teams of specialists developed position papers for all the global trouble 
spots likely to require attention during the treaty negotiations.58
Once containing communism waned as the central issue dominating 
U.S. foreign policy, another major shift in the debate over Wilson’s dip-
lomatic acumen occurred. Thomas J. Knock and Ross A. Kennedy saw 
Wilson taking national security issues and domestic politics into account 
in crafting his peace plan.59 In their view, Wilson linked America’s na-
tional security to promoting friendly, stable, constitutional governments 
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overseas and then had to negotiate domestic support for his ideas among 
competing liberal, Progressive factions that disagreed over how to secure 
these goals. John Thompson furthered this view of Wilson as an agile pol-
itician by arguing that prosecuting the war caused Wilson to modify his 
overall peace plan as his views of Germany changed.
Erez Manela shifted the debate over Wilson’s legacy away from Ameri-
can shores altogether. Instead, Manela focused on how colonized peoples 
around the world responded to Wilsonian ideals. Those leading postwar 
uprisings in Egypt, India, China, and Korea interpreted Wilson’s words 
as a support for anticolonial independence movements, a meaning than 
Wilson never intended. Manela highlights the ways that Wilson tried, 
and failed, to contain the global appeal of his ideas by embracing the 
mandate system and downplaying use of the term “self-determination.”
Debates over the lasting impact of Wilsonianism continued into the 
twenty-fi rst century. Was the 2003 American invasion of Iraq a logical 
consequence or perversion of Wilsonianism?60 Is American security linked 
to establishing and defending friendly, stable, constitutional governments 
overseas? Scholars’ ongoing interest in debating these questions demon-
strates the continued relevance of Wilsonian internationalism.
Regardless of what Wilson thought or intended, he ultimately failed to 
shepherd the Versailles peace treaty through the ratifi cation process. Ex-
plaining this turn of events has fascinated generations of historians. After 
the Senate rejected the treaty, Senator Gilbert M. Hitchcock (Demo-
cratic minority leader) argued that Wilson’s 1919 stroke had impaired his 
political acumen. Edward Weinstein, Arthur Link, and John M. Cooper 
Jr. subsequently embraced the theory that Wilson’s illness prevented him 
from compromising to secure ratifi cation of the treaty.61 Thomas Bailey, 
the fi rst historian to work with records of the peace proceedings, along 
with the papers of Wilson’s presidency, expressed mixed feelings about 
this interpretation. Bailey instead faulted Wilson for caving into Allied 
demands to exclude Germany from the peace process and for signing 
onto an unpopular treaty that punished Germany severely. Wilson com-
pounded these mistakes by adopting a self-righteous refusal to compro-
mise with Senate Republicans to ensure the treaty’s ratifi cation.62
Arno J. Mayer and N. Gordon Levin Jr. offered global-political expla-
nations for the treaty’s failure, shifting the emphasis from Wilson’s po-
litical skills, psychological makeup, and health. Arguing from a Marxist 
framework, they shared the view expressed earlier by Bolshevik revolu-
tionary Vladimir Lenin that Wilson primarily wanted to use the peace 
proceedings to build an international coalition to halt the spread of com-
munism in war-torn Europe. He thus accepted Allied demands as the price 
he had to pay to create this unifi ed anticommunist front.63 Arthur Link 
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and Arthur Walworth maintained that Wilson’s compromises on the 
Versailles treaty refl ected the political strength that Wilson’s political ad-
versaries (both overseas and at home) wielded.64 To Klause Schwabe, in 
Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 1918–1919, 
Wilson’s key mistake was failing to explain adequately to the American 
public why geopolitical realities caused him to support the controversial 
reparations treaty clause.65
The fi gure of Woodrow Wilson thus dominates the scholarly debate 
over why America entered the war, how the nation defi ned its war goals, 
and why the Senate refused to ratify the Versailles peace treaty. These 
questions have remained the nearly exclusive domain of political and dip-
lomatic historians. The histories of how average Americans affected these 
governmental and diplomatic decisions have yet to be written.
The Home Front
The home-front experience has drawn attention from economic, politi-
cal, and, more recently, social historians who seek to understand how the 
United State mobilized, and the subsequent consequences for the econ-
omy, regulatory reform movements, and civil liberties. Examining how the 
government utilized its new wartime powers provides a common thread 
to home-front studies. Scholarly interpretations also refl ect the ongoing 
debate within American society over what role the federal government 
should play in managing the economy and safeguarding civil liberties.
Economic historians have evaluated the effi cacy of wartime economic 
mobilization and assessed its legacy. In the immediate postwar period, 
the fi rsthand accounts of wartime administrators tended to reinforce the 
comforting narrative of Americans pulling together voluntarily to win 
the war, downplaying problems of war profi teering or business intransi-
gence.66 Studies in the 1940s and 1950s repeated this narrative of initial 
chaos giving way to eventual success, while acknowledging the increased 
infl uence of businessmen in governmental affairs. These conclusions mir-
rored generally accepted truths about how the United States fought and 
won World War II, while simultaneously recognizing growing concerns 
over the emergence of the Cold War–era military-industrial complex.
Scholars writing in the sixties offered a dramatically different charac-
terization of wartime economic mobilization. New Left historians writing 
in the Vietnam era focused more fully on what they saw as the co-option 
of the war effort by business elites who wanted to derail the momentum 
of prewar regulatory reform movements. Gabriel Kolko, James Weinstein, 
and Melvyn Urofsky portrayed business as emerging triumphant from 
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the war, with the government now a willing partner advancing their in-
terests.67 David Kennedy, author of the widely read Over Here: The First 
World War and American Society, agreed that the war essentially re-empow-
ered conservative and reactionary elements, preventing the decade-long 
Progressive reform movement from making any further regulatory gains.68 
William Leuchtenburg, however, urged historians to take a longer view 
in assessing the war’s legacy.69 Leuchtenburg saw continuity between the 
methods employed by wartime economic mobilization agencies and early 
New Deal approaches to stabilizing wages and prices during the Depres-
sion. Ellis Hawley continued this line of analysis, arguing that the cooper-
ative wartime relationship between business and the federal government 
created a permanent role for the liberal state in the American economy.70
The decision to rely on conscription to raise a mass army also granted 
new powers to the state. In To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to Modern 
America, John Whiteclay Chambers II argued that federal management of 
the selective service system contributed to the twentieth-century trend of 
transferring power from the local and state level to the national govern-
ment.71 Christopher Capozzola’s Uncle Sam Wants You: World War I and 
the Making of the Modern American Citizen employed Kennedy’s concept of 
“coercive voluntarism” to describe the phenomenon of local civic groups 
policing their communities to ensure 100 percent “voluntary” compli-
ance with wartime edicts.72 Capozzola believes that the increased willing-
ness of localities to cede authority to the federal government resulted in 
a new national security state with vast investigative and policing powers.
These historians see World War I as a key transitional moment in 
state-building within the United States. Robert Cuff, however, examined 
“the gap between the rhetoric and reality” and concluded that admin-
istrators in charge of wartime economic agencies tended to exaggerate 
their infl uence in managing the wartime economy.73 He drew a portrait 
of complex economic relationships between individual industries and 
government offi cials that defi ed easy categorization. Some were harmo-
nious, others contentious, and in his view, all were temporary, casting 
doubt on the notion that the war represented a critical turning point in 
capitalist-state relations. Others carried Cuff’s interpretative thread for-
ward by examining the ideological objections among high-level federal 
administrators to monopolistic business practices, tensions between the 
civilian-led War Industries Board and the War Department’s procure-
ment bureaus, and the government takeover of the railroads during the 
war.74 These studies suggest that the semiautonomous power wielded by 
individuals and agencies within the Wilson administration resulted in an 
array of priorities and strategies, preventing any one single wartime re-
lationship with business from taking root. These scholars offered a more 
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nuanced view of government-business relations during the war years than 
New Left historians, but all agreed on the postwar resurgence of business 
in American politics.
More recent scholarship shifts the moment when the demands and 
desires of business prevailed from the period of mobilization to demo-
bilization. Joseph McCartin and Robert H. Zieger analyzed the process 
of economic mobilization from the perspective of labor unions.75 They 
agreed that federal agencies abetted the growth of moderate labor unions 
despite objections from business, prefi guring the labor-friendly policies 
of the 1930s New Deal. Unsurprisingly studies focusing on the fate of 
radical labor groups, who often opposed the war, told a dramatically dif-
ferent story of state suppression and harassment.76 More recently, Carl R. 
Weinberg’s Labor, Loyalty, and Rebellion: Southwestern Illinois Coal Miners 
and World War I challenged the notion that labor benefi ted from the war 
by focusing on how hyper-patriotism bred divisiveness within the ranks 
of labor unions.77 The resulting disunity and distrust hampered efforts to 
mount effective strikes in 1919, Weinberg maintains.
Egregious violations of Americans’ civil liberties occurred during World 
War I. The government gained signifi cant power to limit free expression 
when the 1917 Espionage Act made interference with the draft illegal 
and gave the postmaster general the right to withhold materials deemed 
treasonous from the mail. The 1918 Sedition Act enlarged these pro-
hibitions by outlawing abusive language about the government. Paul L. 
Murphy linked the arrests of dissidents and subsequent court challenges 
by socialists, radicals, and pacifi sts to the birth of a new postwar political 
movement dedicated to protecting civil liberties. Geoffrey Stone points 
out that court challenges forced the Supreme Court to defi ne the right 
to free speech for the fi rst time and concludes that Americans generally 
accepted the argument that civil liberties were a luxury the nation could 
not afford in wartime.78
Theodore Kornweibel’s books tracing the federal surveillance of black 
civil rights organizations during and after the war, “Seeing Red”: Federal 
Campaigns against Black Militancy, 1919–1925 and Investigate Everything: 
Federal Efforts to Compel Black Loyalty during World War I, reveal the 
government’s determination to use the war as an opportunity to cripple 
the civil rights movement.79 The Justice Department justifi ed this sup-
pression by claiming that civil rights organizations were infested with 
German spies trying to incite racial violence. German communities 
came under attack as the federal government demanded that German 
immigrants register with the police as enemy aliens, states passed laws 
banning the teaching of German, symphonies stopped playing German 
music, and people changed their names to avoid mob attacks. Vigilante 
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violence against Germans or German Americans suspected as disloyal 
became a mainstay of wartime America. As a result, Frederick Luebke 
argues in Bonds of Loyalty: German-Americans and World War I, people of 
German ancestry rushed to demonstrate their “Americanness” by assim-
ilating as completely as possible.80 Almost overnight, the nation’s larg-
est and most infl uential immigrant culture disappeared and was never 
resurrected.
Jeannette Keith’s study of draft resistance throughout the rural South 
offers a counternarrative that demonstrates the possibility for some hu-
man agency in this police state environment. At a time when openly crit-
icizing governmental policy became practically impossible, the surprise, 
she suggests, was not that the new selective service system operated with 
a minimum of protest but rather that there was any successful draft dodg-
ing at all.81 As conscientious objectors discovered, outright evasion often 
worked better than trying to gain an offi cial exemption based on religious 
or pacifi st beliefs.
Commanders, Strategy, and Operations
General John J. Pershing, the commander of the American Expedition-
ary Forces (AEF), took the lead in establishing one major interpretative 
school of thought among military historians with his two-volume auto-
biography, My Experiences in the World War.82 This memoir championed 
Pershing’s tenacity in overcoming a series of obstacles, including Allied 
demands that the Americans amalgamate their troops into preexisting 
French and British armies. After a few trials by fi re, the independent 
American army evolved into a fi rst-rate fi ghting force that played a crit-
ical role in winning the war. In his autobiography, Pershing ignored the 
contributions of his chief of staff Peyton March, who established a second 
major interpretative thread by severely criticizing Pershing’s command in 
his memoir, The Nation at War.83
Harvey A. DeWeerd, in President Wilson Fights His War: World War I 
and the American Intervention, and Edward Coffman, in The War to End All 
Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I, added some qual-
ifi cations to Pershing’s tale of glowing success but overall saw the AEF 
as eventually overcoming its “growing pains” to fi ght successfully on the 
Western Front.84 In Learning Lessons in the American Expeditionary Forces, 
Kenneth Hamburger focused on how the AEF studied its mistakes and 
corrected them in time to win the war.85 Subsequent scholarly biographies 
of Pershing and his commanders generally depicted Pershing as a war-
time commander who chose his staff well, did not shy away from making 
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diffi cult decisions, and successfully created the organizational structure 
needed to fi ght a modern, industrial war.86
In the 1980s, a revisionist school went on the offensive and ques-
tioned the accuracy of the Pershing narrative. They portrayed the high 
U.S. casualty rate as avoidable rather than a necessary part of the army’s 
growing pains. James W. Rainey, Timothy K. Nenninger, and Paul Braim 
characterized the AEF as a poorly trained, led, supplied, and deployed 
force whose slow improvements over time did not excuse the signifi cant 
mistakes made by AEF commanders.87 Rainey was perhaps the most se-
vere critic, attacking AEF doctrine, training, and combat performance. 
“In having to grope its way to victory, the AEF succeeded not because of 
imaginative operations and tactics nor because of qualitative superiority 
in open warfare, but rather by smothering German machine guns with 
American fl esh,” Rainey wrote.88 Revisionist scholars took particular is-
sue with Pershing’s insistence on undertaking the pre-planned attack in 
September 1918 on the Saint-Mihiel salient, even after Marshal Ferdi-
nand Foch, the supreme commander of the Allied Forces, made it clear 
that the Americans would have to participate in a coordinated Allied 
attack two weeks later. The AEF consequently began the Meuse-Argonne 
offensive with its best divisions recovering in the rear and the logistical 
network in disarray.
Another body of work challenged the tendency to judge American 
success by how well Pershing realized his goal of creating an independent 
army. David Trask, Robert Bruce, and Mitchell Yockelson instead iden-
tifi ed American participation in coalition warfare as the real reason the 
Allies prevailed.89 Michael S. Neiberg makes an equally strong case for a 
coalition, rather than American, victory in the fi rst monograph-length 
study of the Second Battle of the Marne, a pivotal battle and the only one 
where British, French, and American forces fought together during the 
entire war.90
Other historians have analyzed organizational structures and modes of 
command, not just personalities, to examine American combat effective-
ness. Following in the footsteps of Tim Travers, who identifi ed a “laissez-
faire” system of command within British commander Douglas Haig’s 
headquarters that made Haig resistant to change, Nenninger concluded 
that “most of the problems of American command in World War I con-
cerned execution.”91 Nenninger argued that battlefi eld conditions ham-
pered the fl ow of information between the front lines and headquarters, 
while poor map-reading skills prevented unit commanders from enacting 
carefully designed battle plans. Brian Neumann analyzed how ambiguity 
over the chain of authority caused nearly nonstop friction between the 
newly created, Washington-based, General Staff and Pershing’s overseas 
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AEF headquarters. Neumann faulted Wilson and Secretary of War New-
ton D. Baker for not exercising civilian control over the military to clarify 
the lines of authority.92
Redressing the surprising lack of scholarly interest in American opera-
tional history, Mark E. Grotelueschen and Edward G. Lengel focused on 
the learning curve underway within divisions and companies directly in-
volved in the fi ghting.93 Their work followed the example set by historians 
who have studied the British Expeditionary Force. Travers, Robin Prior, 
Trevor Wilson, and Gary Sheffi eld argued that British fi eld command-
ers had developed effective methods of attack by 1918.94 Grotelueschen’s 
The AEF Way of War: The American Army and Combat in World War I 
and Lengel’s To Conquer Hell: The Meuse-Argonne, 1918 struck a middle 
ground between the Pershing narrative and revisionist accounts.95 In their 
view, the most substantial and effective learning occurred from the bot-
tom up. Pershing’s training doctrine emphasized “open warfare,” a set of 
ideas that privileged infantry manpower, the rifl e and bayonet, simple at-
tack plans, and maximizing maneuver with the hope of making a decisive 
breakthrough. Through coalition warfare and their own combat experi-
ence, Americans developed a better appreciation for “trench warfare,” 
which was not strictly defensive as they originally thought, but instead 
integrated cutting-edge technology, employed detailed attack plans, max-
imized fi repower, and relied on methodical attacks to achieve smaller, in-
cremental gains. “Despite Pershing’s hopes of driving the Germans out of 
their trenches and defeating them in ‘open warfare’ with ‘self-reliant in-
fantry,’” Groteleuschen writes, the men fi ghting the war “increasingly saw 
machines, and especially those technologies that maximized fi repower, 
rather than fl esh, as the proper means of waging war in the modern era.”96
The most controversial issue surrounding the performance of the 
American military involves deciding whether the United States deserves 
all, some, or none of the credit for winning the war. John Mosier and 
Geoffrey Wawro carried into the present-day Pershing’s claim that the 
Americans were responsible for the Allies’ decisive win.97 On the other 
side of the pendulum, World War I historians Gary Sheffi eld, Robin Prior, 
Trevor Wilson, and Tim Travers (whose works are cited above) viewed the 
American military contribution as negligible. Most American scholars of 
the AEF are more circumspect than Mosier, but not quite ready to grant 
the Allies exclusive credit for the ultimate victory. The consensus view 
contends that the Americans most certainly prevented the Allies from 
losing the war. Mainstream accounts emphasize the infusion of American 
troops that helped stem the 1918 German spring offensives and fueled the 
overall Allied counterattack and advance, German demoralization when 
faced with the prospect of millions more Americans arriving in 1919, the 
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effectiveness of the convoy system, and the importance of ongoing Amer-
ican fi nancial support as critical contributions that the United States and 
its armed forces made to the Allied victory.
The Doughboys’ War
It took until 1963 for a soldier’s memoir to become a bestseller. In The 
Doughboys, Laurence Stallings, a Marine who lost a leg in the Battle of 
Belleau Wood and later became a famous playwright, peppered his nar-
rative with a nostalgic collection of vignettes that took stock of the 
hardships encountered by brave American fi ghting men on the road to 
victory.98 Stallings essentially told the traditional Pershing story of trib-
ulation ending with success through the eyes of average soldiers rather 
than military commanders.
The pathbreaking book by literary critic Paul Fussell, The Great War 
and Modern Memory, showed social and cultural historians how they 
could make the war their own.99 Fussell took readers on a tour of the 
trenches, entering the fi ghting men’s secret world of combat, rituals, 
myths, superstitions, and rumors. The war, Fussell asserted, ushered in a 
new way of understanding the world as Europeans abandoned romanti-
cism and embraced irony. Fussell relied heavily on writings from famous 
British literary fi gures who served along the Western Front to support his 
conclusions, leading to accusations that he had extrapolated vast cultural 
trends from a small sampling of sources. Despite his shortcomings as an 
historian, Fussell revolutionized World War I studies by demonstrating 
the validity of using a cultural and social history approach to understand 
the fi ghting man’s experience.100
American social and cultural historians have subsequently offered new 
insights into the doughboy experience. Mark Meigs, in Optimism at Arma-
geddon: Voices of American Participants in the First World War, juxtaposed 
the “offi cial” culture created in top echelons with the “unoffi cial” cultural 
practices initiated by troops to trace the evolution of a military mass cul-
ture during the war.101 In Doughboys, the Great War, and the Remaking of 
America, I examined the internal strife over training, combat, discipline, 
race relations, and demobilization and argued that civilian soldiers ex-
erted tremendous power in shaping the policies and behavior of the war-
time military.102 Richard Schweitzer and Jonathan Ebel have examined 
religiosity in the trenches.103
Foreign-born and second-generation Americans formed a signifi cant 
proportion of the wartime force, but to date these experiences have re-
ceived limited scholarly attention. Christopher Sterba’s Good Americans: 
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Italian and Jewish Immigrants during the First World War analyzed how 
Jewish and Italian soldiers imbued their military service with meanings 
that strengthened their distinct ethnic identities while also offering new 
opportunities to demonstrate their “Americanness.”104 Historians of the 
Mexican American experience have also examined how wartime mobiliza-
tion accelerated assimilation in the Southwest, undertaking labor-intensive 
research to undercover the “hidden history” of Spanish-speaking soldiers 
in the offi cial records.105 Richard Slotkin interwove the experiences of 
foreign-born soldiers and African Americans to examine the war’s place 
in America’s ongoing struggle to create a multicultural and multiracial 
democracy.106
Progressive reformers more interested in social than economic reform 
found a ready laboratory in the wartime military. In Americans All! Foreign-
Born Soldiers in World War I, Nancy Gentile Ford argues against the dom-
inant idea that Progressivism fell on hard times during the war.107 Ford 
examined the culturally sensitive training and recreational programs for 
foreign-born soldiers (20 percent of the total force) developed by a cadre 
of Progressive settlement house workers, reform-minded army offi cers, 
and civilian ethnic leaders. Similarly, Beth Linker traces how a Progres-
sive health ethos that put a premium on rehabilitating wounded soldiers 
into productive citizens and workers shaped military rehabilitation pro-
grams.108 These publications demonstrate that by working for wartime 
effort, Progressive reformers tried to advance their broader goals of en-
larging state power through expertly designed and administered public 
policies.
Overall, social and cultural studies of the American fi ghting man have 
not kept pace with the proliferation of studies on combat, morale, and war 
culture for European soldiers. Social historians have tended to shy away 
from studying the military experience, not just of World War I but of all 
wars. The recent proliferation of studies devoted to the African Ameri-
can soldier experience offers one important exception, an area where the 
social history approach is thriving.
Struggles for Social Justice: African Americans and Women
Works devoted to African Americans and women tend to examine how 
participation in the war effort ignited or transformed struggles for social 
justice. The rhetorical link between citizenship and wartime service cre-
ated openings for blacks and women to demand equitable treatment. 
Nonetheless, ingrained racial and gender hierarchies remained remark-
ably resilient in the face of war-generated social upheaval. Scholarly 
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works on African Americans and women also underscore that routine 
violence was a fact of life for civilians and soldiers alike.
For years, Arthur Barbeau and Florette Henri’s The Unknown Soldiers: 
African-American Soldiers in World War I (1974; reprint 1996) served as 
the stand-alone study of African American soldiers.109 Heavily infl uenced 
by academic currents in the 1970s critical of the white-male-dominated 
narrative of American history, the book fi t into a larger scholarly drive 
to “rediscover” the diversity of experiences that collectively made up the 
nation’s historical past. The idea that one book would suffi ce to interpret 
this experience, however, also revealed the separate scholarly agendas 
of military and African American historians throughout the 1980s and 
1990s. The former had yet to embrace social history, while the latter re-
mained largely uninterested in the topic of military service.
In what is now a crowded fi eld, recent studies of African American 
soldiers interpret the war as a pivotal moment in the civil rights move-
ment. Scholars attribute this shift to the war’s heightened democratic 
rhetoric, the emergence of more militant civil rights leaders, worsening 
racial violence, and black soldiers’ experiences in France. Harlem Rattlers 
and the Great War: The Undaunted 369th Regiment and the African Amer-
ican Quest for Equality, a magisterial work by Jeffrey T. Sammons and 
John H. Morrow Jr., examines the war’s most famous African American 
unit through the lens of local, national, and international politics to re-
veal just how many hurdles stood in the way of its eventual success.110 
Chad L. Williams provides the most extensive investigation to date of 
postwar veteran political activism within the African American commu-
nity, albeit through often short-lived veterans’ movements.111 Adrianne 
Lentz-Smith primarily examines the experience of noncombatants, ex-
ploring how their daily encounters with unrelenting racism gave birth 
to a new political consciousness.112 The resulting activism, not all of it 
successful, laid the groundwork for how activists would respond to the 
next world war. Collectively, these works demonstrate how wartime mo-
bilization gave African Americans the opportunity and motivation to 
experiment with new methods and strategies for challenging white su-
premacy. Interestingly, these works also rely heavily on French archival 
material, a relatively new development in studies of the American war 
experience.
The 1920 ratifi cation of the Nineteenth Amendment to the U.S. Con-
stitution granting women the right to vote occupies a central place in the 
political historical narrative of equal rights.113 Most histories devoted to 
the suffrage movement credit female mobilization during World War I 
as an important, but not decisive, factor in securing women the right to 
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vote. More recently, historians have begun to consider other aspects of 
American women’s wartime experiences.
One strand of inquiry investigates how the wartime mobilization of 
women fi ts into the history of working women. Susan Zeiger analyzes the 
experiences of the 16,500 working women who donned uniforms for the 
AEF and concludes that little changed.114 The government mobilized 
working women out of necessity but tried to avoid any redefi nition of so-
cietal gender roles by placing these women under male supervision. Lynn 
Dumenil’s The Second Line of Defense: American Women and World War I 
argues that the American proclivity to forget—this time about how vital 
women’s labor (both paid and voluntary) was to winning the war—meant 
that achieving “liberation through war work” remained little more than 
wishful thinking.115 Another line of inquiry examines the leadership roles 
that middle-class women, who had the leisure time to belong to an array 
of social clubs, assumed as grassroots organizers who effectively mobilized 
white and black communities across the nation.116 Kimberly Jensen, by 
contrast, explores how violence against women was accepted as a legiti-
mate method of controlling unruly women (suffragists and striking work-
ers) and ignored when U.S. soldiers assaulted female nurses and military 
workers.117 Recovering this history of violence against women, Jensen 
sees the fi ght for full-fl edged citizenship as a struggle to protect the female 
body, not just a campaign to acquire the right to vote.
Conclusion
Over the last hundred years, scholars have debated multiple aspects of 
the war experience, and the centennial generated increased interest and 
attention in World War I. Nonetheless, the number of dedicated World 
War I historians remains quite small within the United States. Many of 
the historians included here would be surprised to see themselves iden-
tifi ed as World War I historians. Instead, they position their scholarship 
within the historiographical debates of subfi elds such as labor-capital re-
lations, domestic reform movements, women’s history, African American 
history, and civil liberties. After writing their World War I–related books, 
many go on to publish books on other topics of greater appeal within 
their subfi elds. World War I does not hold their interest for very long. 
The challenge for scholars in the twenty-fi rst century thus remains what 
it has been since 1945: fi nding a way to weave the war indelibly into the 
national historical narrative. Completing the proposed World War I Me-
morial in Washington, DC, would be a good start.
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